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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

Reserve

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

A brief list of references compiled in the Library of the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Comp. by Margaret T. Olcott.

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Washington, D. C.
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This is a brief account of the propositions made to the Economic Conference at Geneva by the bloc of eight central and eastern European countries which was organized at Warsaw in August, 1930, and of the discussion to which these propositions gave rise. The questions submitted to the conference dealt with the granting of preferential tariffs on grain and agricultural products in favor of the countries forming the bloc, the organization of the grain trade in Europe and the organization of agricultural credit.

Commission internationale d'agriculture. Annales de la Commission internationale d'agriculture. Premiere partie. Proces-verbal de l'Assemblee generale tenue a Anvers, le 8 aout 1930. Deuxieme partie. Proces-verbal de la reunion de la Commission speciale de la cooperation agricole tenue a Anvers, le 9 aout 1930. Paris, 1930 116p.

At head of title: III.

Contents of Part 1 include the following: La situation de l'agriculture, by Ernest Laur; Le role des cooperatives agricoles dans le commerce international du ble, by Ladislav Feierabend; La crise des cereales, by Warmbold; L'accord polono-allemand sur l'exportation du seigle; by Georges Goscicki; La participation de la Pologne au commerce mondial des cereales, by Auguste Poplauski; Le lait et les produits laitiers, by H. Bretscher; L'oeuf a la production dans le commerce - a la consommation, by Mannes; L'organisation rationnelle des debauches. Le vin, by Auge-Laribe; Les echanges internationaux portent sur le betail et la viande, by Contades and H. Rouy; L'institution de services d'informations commerciales, by Ernest Laur.

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The Conference of the agrarian countries in Warsaw. (In Polish Economist, v.5, no. 10, Oct., 1930, p. 274-278. May be obtained from 149 East 67th Street, New York, N. Y.)

At a conference held in Warsaw August 28-30, 1930, representatives of eight agrarian countries of South and East Europe drew up a number of resolutions to be submitted to their respective governments. These dealt with the reorganization of the export trade in agricultural products, the unification of statistical methods in connection with the export of agricultural products and the regular and rapid interchange of these statistics, the abolition of direct export subsidies on agricultural products, the establishment of a technical, financial commission to formulate a uniform plan for the granting of agricultural credit, and preferential treatment for agricultural products of European origin. It was proposed that a permanent committee for economic investigation be appointed to carry out the decisions made by the economic leaders of the individual countries to be called in conference once a year.

Herle, Jakob, and Metzner, Max. Neue beitrage zum kartellproblem. Berlin, R. Hobbing, 1929. 120p. 286 H42

The development of cartels in Germany since stabilization of the currency, their underlying principles, and the prospects for their future growth are discussed. A short chapter deals with international cartels and cartels in countries outside of Germany.

International economic agreement. Conferences in Eastern Europe. (In Industrial and Labour Information, v. 35, no. 13. Sept. 29, 1930. p. 415-416. May be obtained from L. Magnusson, 701 Lenox Building 1523 L Street, Washington, D. C.)

The main conclusions reached by the delegates to the conferences of Bucharest, Sinaia, and Warsaw are given. Special reference is made to agricultural marketing.

Rose, Adam. Zur Konferenz der landwirtschaftsminister der agrarstaaten. (In Vierteljahrshefte der polnischen Landwirtschaft, bd. 1, hft. 4. July, 1930, p. 5-12. Published by Die Gesellschaft fur Landwirtschaftliche Bildungswesen. Landwirtschaftliche Buchlandlung, Nowy Swiat 35, Warsaw, Poland)

The author discusses the necessity for the proposed conference at Warsaw of the ministers of agriculture of the agrarian countries of East and Central Europe in order to formulate an international policy with regard to rationalization of production and regulation of export.

Roumania. Ministere de l'industrie et du commerce. La conference agricole internationale de Bucarest, 18-21 octobre 1930 (The international agricultural conference of Bucharest, Oct. 18-21, 1930) (In its Correspondance economique Roumaine, annee 12, no. 5, Sept./Oct. 1930, p.5-62)

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The two Europes. (In the Economist (London) v.III, no. 4, 542, Sept. 13, 1930, p. 472 - 473)

An editorial on the Warsaw Conference.

U. S. Bureau of foreign and domestic commerce. Trade promotion series no. 81. Representative international cartels, combines and trusts, by William F. Notz. Washington, U. S. Govt. print. off., 1929. 76p. 157.54 T67 no.81

Wallace, Benjamin B. and Edminster, Lynn R. International control of raw materials. Washington, D. C., The Brookings institution, 1930. 479p. 286 W15

This volume deals primarily with government control of exports of raw materials and attempts to examine and appraise the results of certain typical instances of this control. The authors discuss first the conditions which have led to the "revival of an old and largely abandoned device of Mercantilism." There follows a consideration of the extent and scope of such control including a list of 20 commodities to which it has been applied and a rapid survey of the objects and methods of control. The authors then discuss in some detail the control of sodium nitrate by Chile, the camphor monopoly of the Japanese government, the Franco-German potash combine, the Brazilian valorization and control of coffee, the British export restrictions on rubber, and the Canadian embargoes on pulpwood. There are also four useful appendices as follows: (A) Chronology of the Development of Controls of Exports of Raw Products, (B) The Incidence of an Export Tax, (C) Statistical Tables, (D) Documents.

COFFEE

Proposed world coffee cartel. (In Tea and Coffee Trade Journal, v.60, no. 3, Mar., 1931, p.293. Published by the Tea and Coffee Trade Journal Co., 79 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.)

On February 26, 1931, the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce of Brazil announced that the formation of an international coffee cartel would be sought at the coming Brazil Coffee Congress. It is proposed that the world's coffee-growing nations be combined in a single group in order to maintain the equilibrium of the supply and demand and to establish a normal price for coffee.

Roth, Hans. Die weltkaffeevorräte. (In Wirtschaftsdienst, jahrg. 15, hft. 32. Aug. 8, 1930, p. 1367-1369. May be obtained from Friederichsen, de Gruyter & Co., Hamburg, 36, Germany)

The world surplus coffee production is discussed, and, more particularly the situation in Brazil where the valorization policy has proved a failure. It is suggested that the stored coffee be put on the market, and that long-term loans be granted to the Brazilian planters to enable them to meet expenses until the market is stabilized again.

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GRAIN

Colegrove, Kenneth. The German-Polish rye agreement. (In Journal of Political Economy, v.39, no.2, Apr. 1931, p.213-228. Published at the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.)

The eastern provinces of Germany produce a surplus of rye. The western and southern sections import a portion of their supplies. Hence under a system of tariff protection the prices of rye in the western provinces tended to equal the world market pricesplus the tariff, while the prices in the eastern districts were those of the western minus the cost of overland transportation across the Empire. In order to extend the benefits of government action to the eastern exporting provinces, the German Government in 1894 adopted the import certificate plan. Certificates were issued to the exporters of grain. These could be used for the payment of duties on the importation of grain. The result was that of placing the Cologne and Koenigsberg markets on similar price levels. The system was revived after the war (1925). Later developments led to the concentration of exports control under government guidance. In 1929 the Polish Government adopted similar measures. Its rye exports increased. German rye met with severe competition abroad. Production in both countries increased. Large stocks accumulated. Prices in foreign markets declined. With a view to eliminating disastrous competition for foreign outlets, the two governments established the German-Polish Rye Commission - February 18, 1930. This Commission enjoys monopolistic privileges in both countries in the exportation of rye. Germany receives 60 percent of the export trade and Poland supplies 40 percent. The Commission has authority to fix minimum export prices for rye. On July 5, 1930, the German Government ceased to issue export certificates. This has resulted in the temporary suspension, at least, of Germany's cooperation in the undertaking. - Asher Hobson.

Forderungen der landwirtschaftskreise auf dem gebiete der getreidepolitik im wirtschaftsjahre 1930-31. (In Vierteljahrshefte der polnischen Landwirtschaft, bd. 1, hft. 4, July, 1930, p. 186-191. Published by Die Gesellschaft für Landwirtschaftliche Bildungswesen. Landwirtschaftliche Buchhandlung, Nowy Swiat 35, Warsaw, Poland)

The agricultural policy of Poland for 1930-31 was discussed at a conference held at the Ministry of Agriculture on May 23-24, 1930, and attended by delegates from agricultural organizations all over the country. The grain policy and the regulation of the grain trade were the main topics discussed. It was agreed that the import tariff on grain should be high enough to protect Polish agriculture against the competition, not only of countries with lower production costs, but also those in which the export of grain is subsidized by special dumping ordinances; that the payment

Chile

of export premiums on rye, barley, oats, and wheat should be continued, but that the amount paid should not be changed oftener than every three months; that the union of grain exporters should continue in existence and that the restrictions on the milling of rye should be abolished as well as those on the export of clover. Disappointment was expressed with the outcome of the Polish-German rye agreement, but it was believed that there was still hope that it might be the first step towards an international agreement among rye exporters. A strong plea was made for the building up of a grain trade by means of cooperation, the provision of storage and transport facilities, the centralization of the export trade, government assistance in maintaining the price level, and grain standardization.

Glaser, Geza. The international wheat pool and the cessation of the economic crisis of the world... Budapest, Printed by F. Kertesz, 1931. 15p.

The author is Vice-President of the Hungarian Ground Renting Society. He argues that the comparative stability of industry has been brought about by combination and by the proper control of prices and that agriculture should resort to the same type of action. He explains that an effective agricultural "trust" or "combine" would not consist of the organization of the individual agriculturists of the various countries nor even of the agrarian institutions of the countries, but the correct method would be somewhat as follows for the maize-exporting countries of the world, for instance. These seven countries - Argentine, United States of America, Union of South Africa, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria - should be called to a conference with the idea that each country should create separately a central maize-exporting office and these offices in turn should found an international maize pool, which in principle is what many industrial companies have done. If this should be done the author thinks that the greater part of the interested countries would join in the pool. The next step is not so clear. We quote: "In countries where this would not take place, the export institute could be formed by means of compulsion, as for instance in the shape under which the Polish swine-exporting syndicate operates, that is to say a due of 20 dollars would have to be paid on every exported ton of maize whilst the export institute would export its maize duty free."

The author then takes up the question of wheat after giving export figures for the ten exporting countries for 1929-30. We quote again:

"It can be ascertained from the above figures that overseas countries including Australia, are waging a wheat war with 113,863,000 quintals of wheat against the European 11,068,000 quintals.

"The United States of America are the heaviest hit by this warfare as they have sacrificed nearly 500 million dollars in the past year

in order to increase home prices and to cover flour dumping expenses.

"This agricultural war has already threatened the existence and also the social peace of European and other overseas agrarian countries.

"The consolidation question of the world depends on whether we are able to persuade the United States of America to put a stop to this agricultural warfare. There can be no doubt that if we employ an instrument before which even the American citizen will lay down his arms, we shall achieve our purpose. This mighty weapon is a pencil and the calculation which we must make is very simple indeed. The American wheat surplus for 1929-30 was 25,979,000 quintals, approximately 96 million bushels. The dumping method of selling this quantity together with the administrative expenses amount to at least 1 1/2 dollars per quintal, this being equal to 40 1/2 cents per bushel, making a total loss of 39 million dollars whilst the present value of the 11,068,000 quintals of European export wheat, if calculated at 2.10 dollars is not more than 23.2 million dollars.

"For this price America could buy, and even save 15.8 million dollars of the money sacrificed to the dumping policy, by buying the whole of the European wheat and, in addition to this, she would be able to dictate the wheat prices all over the world.

"If all the wheat-exporting countries were to form a central pool, the 25,979,000 quintals of surplus wheat could be sold for at least 1 1/2 dollars more per quintal and instead of there appearing a debit balance of 39 million dollars owing to dumping, there would be an equivalent surplus.

"We may therefore say that the difference in price on exported wheat alone, if sold by a central organization, would be 78 million dollars in one year. Further the whole export wheat surplus of the European export states for the past ten years could have been purchased with the 500 million dollars which were spent in 1929/30 in order to keep the prices up. And such amounts are worth while considering even in America.

"It is therefore undeniable that, following a formation of an international pool and the productive sale of wheat, the high prices for wheat from the States would react on the price of wheat, used for internal consumption (194,000,000 quintals, about 720 million bushels) to the extent of raising the price by at least a dollar per quintal and this would mean a further profit of 194 million dollars to farmers. So that, adding the price of the export wheat to that of the profit on wheat used at home, the increased income over the present day price for the two together would be at least 223 million dollars without any sacrifice being made. Furthermore, the grave danger of collapse of agriculture which is threatened would be avoided not only in Europe but also in the whole world. And a collapse of agriculture in Europe is

in order to increase home prices and to cover flour dumping expenses.

"This agricultural war has already threatened the existence and also the social peace of European and other starvers agrarian countries.

"The consolidation question of the world depends on whether we are able to persuade the United States of America to put a stop to this agricultural warfare. There can be no doubt that if we employ an instrument before which even the American citizen will lay down his arms, we shall achieve our purpose. This mighty weapon is a pencil and the calculation which we must make is very simple indeed. The American wheat surplus for 1929-30 was 25,979,000 quintals, approximately 75 million bushels. The dumping method of selling this quantity together with the administrative expenses amount to at least 1 1/2 dollars per quintal, this being equal to 42 1/2 cents per bushel, making a total loss of 33 million dollars whilst the present value of the 11,002,000 quintals of European export wheat, if calculated at 2.10 dollars is not more than 23.2 million dollars.

"For this price wheat could buy, and even save 15.8 million dollars of the money sacrificed to the dumping policy, by buying the whole of the European wheat and, in addition to this, she would be able to dictate the wheat prices all over the world.

"If all the wheat-exporting countries were to form a central pool, the 25,979,000 quintals of surplus wheat would be sold for at least 1 1/2 dollars more per quintal and instead of there appearing a debit balance of 33 million dollars owing to dumping, there would be an equivalent surplus.

"We may therefore say that the difference in price on exported wheat alone, if sold by a central organization, would be 75 million dollars in one year. Further the whole export wheat surplus of the European export states for the past ten years could have been purchased with the 500 million dollars which were spent in 1929/30 in order to keep the prices up. And such amounts are worth while considering even in America.

"It is therefore undeniable that, following a formation of an international pool and the productive sale of wheat, the high prices for wheat from the States would react on the price of wheat, used for internal consumption (194,000,000 quintals, about 720 million bushels) to the extent of raising the price by at least a dollar per quintal and this would mean a further profit of 194 million dollars to farmers. So that, adding the price of the export wheat to that of the profit on wheat used at home, the increased income over the present day price for the two together would be at least 243 million dollars without any sacrifice being made. Furthermore, the grave danger of collapse of agriculture which is threatened would be avoided not only in Europe but also in the whole world. And a collapse of agriculture in Europe is

bound to be responsible for a very serious and wide spread crisis, especially with regards to the United States of America, being the creditors for the whole of Europe as it would mean that the repayment of the 10-12 milliard dollars which have been loaned would become problematical.

"If it is possible to convince the United States of the advantages of an international pool by the above arguments, there can be no doubt that the initiation of a pool would become an actual fact.

"The deliverance of the American and Argentine farmers can only be brought about by the creation of this institution. The seven forementioned states as well as the Union of South Africa agreed to this at the various congresses which were held in the States during the course of 1930.

"At a conference held at Belgrade in November last, the five European countries viz. Hungary, Jugoslavia, Roumania, Bulgaria and Poland formally decided to start a central selling organization.

"The primarily competent country to direct the uniformity of this movement would be the United States as they only have sufficient capital for the formation of an international wheat pool based on a warehouse loan, thus the placing would be free of risk. The first work of the pool would be to erect suitable storehouses on the European continent for the Argentine wheat which is now flooding the world markets owing to a lack of this. We could achieve this for a relatively small sum, having in mind its importance, by buying or rather by renting the many mills and factories which have ceased operations...

"We must also examine the question of the influence exercised by the creation of an international produce pool on the importing, or passive states. Whilst studying this question, the first thing that we must consider is that agronomical industry, is also very wide spread in all the passive states and whether we take England or Germany as an example, the whole situation is most precarious. This means that the farmers of the passive agrarian countries would benefit by the advantages of the formation of an international pool and by the consequent control of prices just as much as will those of the active states and without it being necessary to guard against the import of foreign produce by the erection of high customs barriers and by expensive premium systems etc...

"We may boldly state, having assumed the foregoing, that the only instrument which can bring about a definite betterment of events and deflect the agronomical world crisis is the proposed confederation of exporting countries.

"In the same way as the commercial body is able to ensure itself of life and in some cases even of profit by the eradication of unrestricted competition and is so able to rule the markets and dictate prices, so must agriculture have recourse to these very methods, thereby putting a stop to machinations which are based upon prices influenced by speculative demand and offer and sell the produce

on the basis of calculations which are in force at the sale of other commodities.

"The way to put an end to the damage of... dumping would be for those states who purchase part of their requirements from a country which practices dumping to be compelled to pay to the international pool a 50% higher price for the remainder of their purchases. This step is one which is demanded not only by the necessity of world consolidation but also by humanity...

"At the present time we can do no better than to compare the agronomical policy to an engine under full power and without mechanic or fireman abroad to direct the train or to use the brakes. The function of the international pool would be to direct the selling policy and, when necessary, to save agriculture from derailment and annihilation by suitable application of braking power."

Hammatt, T. D. The Balkan grain export cartel. (In Commerce Reports, no. 5, Feb. 2, 1931, p.313-314. Published by the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Washington, D. C.)

Among the results of conferences held by the Balkan countries in the summer and fall of 1930 was "the adoption of an agreement to place before the governments of the grain-exporting countries taking part in these meetings a proposal that in each of them a 'grain export institute' should be formed to take over the total export of that country, and that a 'central export institute' be created, which would have control of the exports made by the respective 'grain export institutes,' the general conception being that each state 'grain export institute,' or internal organization, would endeavor to control production and sale, provide storage, arrange for transportation, etc., for the grain of that country, while for export trade the several state organizations would come together in and be controlled by the 'central export institute,' to the end that mutual underselling and dumping might be eliminated... The ultimate objective appears to be to include as commodities wheat, corn, and rye, and, as countries Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland."

International conference of wheat experts, Rome, 1927. Actes de la I. Conference internationale du ble, Rome - 25-30 avril 1927. Rome, Impr. de l'Institut international d'agriculture, 1928. 602p.
59.9 C763A

This conference of representatives of the principal wheat-producing countries was called by the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome at the request of Premier Mussolini to consider problems relating to both the culture and the marketing of wheat.

Part 1 consists of the minutes of the proceedings of the meetings. Part 2 consists of the papers presented.

Michael, L. G. Grain control conferences in Europe. (In Southwestern Miller, v. 9, no. 46, Jan. 6, 1931, p. 25-26. Published at Kansas City, Mo.)

Gives an account of the grain control conferences held in Europe since July, 1930 and proposals made at these conferences. The delegates at the Belgrade Conference of Nov. 10 to 13, "agreed to recommend to their governments the establishment by March 31, 1931, of national export control boards, where such an organization does not already exist, and that by July 1, 1931, there be established a central control board for the countries indicated."

Ritter, Kurt. Voraussetzungen und bedeutung einer deutsch-polnischen roggenexportverstandigung. (In Wirtschaftsdienst, jahrg. 15, hft. 6, Feb. 7, 1930, p.217-220. May be obtained from Friederichsen, de Gruyter & Co., Hamburg 36, Germany)

A sketch of conditions on the world rye market shows that Germany and Poland produce and export a large share of the world supply of rye. As competing countries they have suffered a number of disadvantages. At the same time, the author sees difficulties, both political and economic, in the way of an effective export agreement. A private export organization with government support established in both countries with mutual supervision is tentatively suggested, but the prevention of underbidding seems the most that can be hoped for.

Wojewodzki, Feliks. Projekt eines internationalen kartells der weizenproduzenten. (In Vierteljahrshefte der polnischen Landwirtschaft, bd. 1, hft. 4, July, 1930, p. 63-89. Published by Die Gesellschaft fur Landwirtschaftliche Bildungswesen. Landwirtschaftliche Buchhandlung, Nowy Swiat 35, Warsaw, Poland)

The author takes issue with the prevalent view that cartelization of agriculture is a chimera. He admits that the attempts in this direction made by the wheat pools in Canada and the farm relief legislation in the United States have failed. But he ascribes this failure to lack of proper organization, and argues that the formation of grain cartels, even when they are powerful, dispose of a large grain supply, and are supported by capital, cannot be successful unless it is based on international agreement. Moreover, the collection of large grain reserves in separate countries is no policy of stabilization, but one of gambling and speculation which has been shown to have disastrous consequences, and which has brought discredit on the fundamentally sound idea of the cartel in agriculture. Without an international agreement of agricultural producers, without the cooperation of governments, both control of the world market and the possibility of stabilization in individual countries are but a fiction to which neither high tariff walls, export premiums, import certificates, nor capital backing can lend reality. Even in Germany the existing grain organizations are not composed of

farmers but almost entirely of millers. The large milling interests with their trade affiliations are the controlling factor on the world market, upon which even the large exporting firms are financially dependent. The author sees the only solution in cartelization as he understands it, i. e., in systematic, concerted action on the part of all agriculturists for the defense of their common interests. In support of this view he outlines a scheme for the establishment of an international wheat cartel. He suggests, as an initial step, that all the wheat producers of Europe and America make an agreement, with the consent and support of their respective governments, with regard to the regulation and stabilization of wheat prices, not only on the world market, but also in the domestic markets of the countries concerned. On the basis of the agreement, an International Cartel of Wheat Producers would be formed, with a central branch in each member country, composed, in turn, of various unions. The council of the international cartel would have the final say in matters of common policy and in the fixing of prices. Two basic prices for a period of from 3 to 5 years would be determined by the council, the producer's price and the price on the domestic market. The method of determining these prices is described. To finance the operations of the cartel, an International Grain Bank would be established, with an available capital of not less than 100 million dollars. It would be either in Europe or America, with an associate bank on the other continent, and branch banks in each country. The functioning of the bank in the stabilizing of prices is sketched in detail. The author believes that the fixing of prices by the cartel and the bank would not only solve the agricultural problem, but would have an important influence on the stabilization of general economic conditions. On these grounds, he feels sure that his scheme is one that will appeal to all governments.

The world grapples with wheat problem. (In Southwestern Miller, v. 10, no. 1, Mar. 3, 1931, p. 23, 24. Published at Kansas City, Mo.)

A short article regarding the two conferences held in Paris recently to consider the European wheat problem. Two of the points brought out are reasons for the conferences and the major questions that stood out in the conferences. The writer states "The second conference... dealt with the problems of disposing of the 1931 crops. So little of definite nature was accomplished on wheat that corn, barley and other coarse grains received only negligible attention."

World wheat and rationalization. (In Statist., v.117, no. 2772, Apr. 11, 1931, p.594-595. Published at 51 Cannon St., London, E. C. 4, England.)

Reviews the deliberations and findings of the Preparatory International Conference of the Second World Wheat Conference.

RUBBER

Holt, E. G. International cooperation among rubber producers. A basis of practical cooperation among European producing interests is attained. (In Commerce Reports, no. 14, Apr. 7, 1930, p.36-38. Published by the U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Washington, D. C.)

This is an account of the Dutch producers' efforts to obtain cooperation with other producers in central selling of rubber, following the abandonment of restriction. Their efforts have culminated in the adoption by the Council of the Rubber Growers Association of a recommendation made by the Anglo-Dutch Liaison Committee that tapping be stopped entirely during May. It is anticipated that this proposal will be supported by a large majority of the members of the association.

Mautner, Wilhelm. Valorisierung des Kautschukpreises. (In Wirtschaftsdienst, Jahrg. 14, Hft. 42, Oct. 18,1929, p. 1811-1814. May be obtained from Friederichsen, de Gruyter & co., Hamburg, 36 Germany)

The author discusses the Dutch plan for the establishment of an international organization to control the sale of rubber, and the objections raised to it in a number of countries.

Rubber and tea topics - A criticism of the restriction scheme. (In Statist, v.115, no. 2714, Mar. 1, 1930, p.369. Published at 51 Cannon St., London, E. C. 4, England)

On the whole the proposals of the Dutch and British planters to restrict tapping of rubber trees during May have been well received in London and Amsterdam, but not so well in Malaya.

"The Council of the Rubber Growers' Association has practically unanimously voted in favour of a resolution recommending producers to agree to cease tapping during May and have invited the co-operation of all local organisations and of Asiatic cultivators ... the scheme, to become effective, must have support equalling 70 per cent of the estate acreage membership of the Dutch and British Association." The question has been raised as to whether this restriction of tapping might not be followed by heavier tapping than normal, especially if there was any appreciable rise in price.

SUGAR

The Chadbourne plan. (In Royal bank of Canada. /Monthly letter/ Mar. 1931. p. /3-4/ Published at Montreal, Canada)

Informe de Prinsen Geerligs presentado a la comision de asuntos economicos de la liga de las naciones sobre la situacion de la industria azucarera. (In Industria Azucarera, ano 35, no. 421, Sept., 1929, p. 687, 689-690;

no. 432, Oct., 1929, p.739-744. Published by Centro Azucarero National, 25 de Mayo 257, Buenos Aires, Argentine Republic. Summary and brief discussion in Facts about Sugar, v.24, no. 43, Nov. 9, 1929, p.1037. Published at 135 Front St., New York.)

This is a draft of a proposed new international sugar convention suggested by a Dutch sugar expert, closely connected with the Java sugar industry. Its aim is the stabilization of production and consumption.

International agreement ratified. (In Facts about Sugar, v. 26, no. 2, Feb., 1931, p. 53. Published at 153 Waverly Place, New York, N. Y.)

"Adjustment of difficulty over German quota brings approval of chief exporting nations. Acceptance by others considered certain." A table gives the revised export quotas of the main sugar-producing countries.

International sugar conference. (In Facts about Sugar, v. 26, no. 1, Jan., 1931, p. 3-5. Published at 153 Waverly Place, New York, N. Y.)

"Two important results were achieved by the conference in Amsterdam... The attainment of a mutual understanding between the representatives of the two leading producers and exporters of sugar (Java and Cuba) which could hardly fail to exercise a strong influence upon the representatives of other exporting countries... (and) the acceptance of the regulation of exports, rather than of production, as the basis for stabilization." The completion of the compact depends on the adherence of Germany.

Java declines to join in export agreement. (In Facts about Sugar, v. 24, no. 48, Nov. 30, 1929, p.1129. Published at 135 Front St., New York.)

"After long deliberation, the Java sugar industry has at last replied, declining the invitation of the sugar industries of Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland and Belgium to participate in an international agreement for the stabilization of the sugar market."

Java organizes new association. (In Facts about Sugar, v. 26, no. 3, Mar., 1931, p. 113. Published at 153 Waverly Place, New York, N. Y.)

New body known as Visico replaces United Sugar Producers and will adopt measures required to give effect to international sugar agreement."

Lamborn & company, inc. Lamborn's sugar bulletin. The Chadbourne plan. Copy of the agreement executed on May 9th, 1931 at Brussels, Belgium, by the sugar producers of Cuba, Java, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Belgium. (New York) Lamborn & company, inc. (1931) 27p.

Mikusch, Gustav. Die internationale zuckerkrise und die versuche zu ihrer lösung. (In Berichte über Landwirtschaft, n.f., bd. 9, hft. 3, 1928, p.230-253. Published by P. Parey, Berlin, Germany)

When the post-war surplus production of sugar resulted in a perilously over-stocked market, the most determined effort to meet the situation was made by Cuba. The Cuban laws of May 3, 1926, and October 7, 1927, curtailed the production of sugar and set up machinery to control its export. An attempt to enlist the cooperation of the European sugar-producing countries and of Java proved finally abortive, and the order for restriction of production in Cuba for 1928/29 was rescinded. The author sees no solution of the problem except in increased consumption, and the enforced withdrawal from the market of those who cannot complete with low prices.

Prinsen Geerligs, H. C. Difficulties of the sugar industry. (In Facts about Sugar, v.25, no.25, Aug., 1930, p.633-636. Published by Palmer Publishing Corporation of N. Y., 153 Waverly Place, New York, N. Y.)

Part of a report prepared for the Economic Committee of the League of Nations is reproduced. It gives a concise picture of the actual world sugar situation and proposes regulation of the export of sugar together with restriction of tariff increase and consumption taxes.

Sugar agreement nears completion. (In Facts about Sugar, v.26, no.4, Apr., 1931, p.153. Published at 153 Waverly Place, New York, N. Y.)

"European countries moving to reduce beet sowing in accordance with provisions for limiting exports. Contract terms ready for signature of adherents." There is a general trend towards decreased acreage even in countries that do not participate in the agreement. But Austria contemplates an increase of 17 per cent in beet sowings. In Holland a bill establishing a state subsidy of four florins per 1000 kilos has been introduced. Sweden will pay a subsidy of 3,800,000 crowns to beet growers. Danish growers are demanding a subsidy.

Sugar federation of the British Empire. An empire sugar policy statement, by the Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, chairman. London, 1930. 10p.

The address is 7, Princes Street, Westminster, London, S. W. 1

The objects of the Sugar Federation of the British Empire as given in this pamphlet are the following:

"I. To promote the interests of the Sugar Industry of the British Empire; II. To collect information in regard to methods of production, transport and marketing; III. To obtain such treatment for Empire-produced sugar as will secure stability; IV. To carry out a programme of propaganda and publicity with a view to increasing the production, sale and consumption of Empire sugar; V. Generally to take such action as may be considered desirable in the interests of the Empire sugar industry."

The chairman concludes his statement of the Empire policy as follows:

"After all, what we need in these days is continuity and stability. Those are the conditions which give the greatest field to far-seeing

enterprise as contrasted with mere speculation. Those are the conditions upon which great industries can be built up. In the sugar industry to-day we have a deep and definite sense of the importance of stable progress. We have a policy in which various Governments of the Empire - the British Government, the Canadian Government, the South African and Australian Governments - have all co-operated. And where you have a unity of Government policy on the one side, on the other side you have also the agreed view of the sugar industry of the Empire: its scattered producers across all the seas, the refining interests, the sugar machinery interests, a large part at any rate of the sugar beet interests, all combined together in this Federation of ours in order to forward a common policy, to compose their differences and to promote their common ends. In doing so they also provide Governments with a responsible body with which Governments can concert policy in the interests of the consumer as well as of the producer. What I therefor hope is that these fears of a complete reversal of policy may prove groundless; and that, apart from any question of factional whim or momentary party advantage, the Governments of the Empire and this great organization over which you have done me the honor to invite me to preside, may collaborate in the best interests of the consumers and producers of the Empire."

The sugar problem. (In Economist, v. 112, no. 4559-4560, Jan. 10, Jan. 17, 1931, p. 56-57, 104-105. Published at 8 Bouverie St., London, E. C. 4, England.

Deals with the progress of the Chadbourne Plan for sugar restriction.

Sugar salvaging begins with Cuban law passage. (In Business Week, Nov. 26, 1930, p. 27, 28. Published at 10th Ave. and 36th St., New York City)

"With the passage Nov. 15 of the Cuban sugar law, American sugar growers scored their first success in the attempt to stabilize the world's sugar industry through international agreement to curtail production. Efforts now will be made to secure the cooperation of foreign producers... The stabilization plan is directed by a committee of United States and Cuban citizens, with Thomas L. Chadbourne as chairman.

"The new Cuban sugar law, based on the Chadbourne plan, calls for the immediate withdrawal of 1 1/2 million tons of Cuban sugar and for the restriction of Cuban exports to the United States. The amount to be segregated will be contributed pro-rata by all mills on the island and sold over a period of 5 years in markets other than the United States. Owners of sugar thus withdrawn will be reimbursed in bonds at the rate of $4 a bag. Cuban exports to the United States on the next crop will be limited to 2,800,000 tons; exports of future crops are to be controlled by the rate of increase in American consumption. The United States producers, on their part, agree to maintain their production at the present level, which is slightly in excess of 3 million tons annually."